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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

H. F. L. P., LLC

)

)
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)
)

Docket No. 41277
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)

Respondent.

)

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
I
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District for TW1I1 Falls County
HON. G. RICHARD BEVAN, District Judge presiding

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
STEVEN A. WUTHRICH. Esq.
1011 Washington St., Suite 101
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Appearing on behalf of Appellant.
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INTRODUCTION
The Respondent, Twin Falls City, has asserted that the Appellant raised "for the first time
on appeal" that "the operative time period in this case is prior to 1961, and not after it." The
Respondent has asserted that the statutory time period for prescriptive easements is twenty years
based upon language in the Complaint and ignored the fact that, after the Complaint was filed, this
Court rendered its ruling in Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Laurence, 153 Idaho 411,283 P .3d 728,
(hereinafter "Capstar III") which specifically provided that the 2006 amendment to Idaho Code
section 5-203 did not apply to an easement by prescription acquired prior to that date, and in such
cases the previous five year limit applies. (Id. at p. 742, fn. 2). Counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellant
(hereinafter "H.F .L.P.") thereafter briefed the issue to the District Court on or about November 19,
2012 and the Court

recogni~ed

same at the onset of trial. Specifically, the colloquy between the

Court and counsel in opening arguments stated:
MR. WUTHRICH: -and I put it in the brief with regard to the time period-I'm not
sure whether you've had one since the amendment in 2006. I'm assuming every court
has dealt with that issue; but I don't know whether Your Honor has.
THE COURT: I don't know that I have taken a case that has gone to conclusion and
judgment involving that, but you certainly cite to the Capstar case; and that rationale,
I think, was also applied in Bachman versus Lawrence. So if you are talking about
the five-year window, then, I think we're operating under that as long as this arose
before the amendment was made in 2006.
MR. WUTHRICH: And that's the time period we'll be looking at. But Ijust wanted
to make sure that Your Honor was aware of that issue. (Tr. p. 13, L. 25 to p. 14, L.
18.) [Emphasis added]
Therefore, the issue of the proper period of prescription was clearly addressed and raised
before the District Court below. Respondent has premised most of its arguments on the erroneous
assumption that the 20-year period applies, which would be a conclusion of law and not a finding
of fact. This highlights the errors of law below and why the decision of the lower Court should be
reversed.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Respondent cites the case of Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 946 P.2d 976 (1997), for the
proposition that "[a] district court's decision that a claimant has established a private prescriptive
easement presents entwined questions of law and fact," citing Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 1000,
1004-05, 829 P.2d 1349, 1353-54 (1992). Appellant agrees. While it is also true that if-and in this
case that's a big IF-"a district court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent,
although conflicting, evidence, this Court will not disturb those findings. Marshall v. Blair, Id. at
979. However, this Court also stated that, "[u]nlike our review of the district court's findings offact,
we exercise free review over the district court's conclusions of law." Id. See also, 0 'Laughlin v.

Circle A Constr., 112 Idaho 1048, 1051, 739 P.2d 347,350 (1987); Carney v. Heinson, 133 Idaho
275, 985 P.2d 1138, 1140 (1999). In the present case, the Appellant has attacked both the
sufficiency of the evidence to support various factual findings, and particularly the conclusions of
law the District Court intertwined therefrom.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
1. Respondent's reliance on the 20-year period is erroneous as a matter oflaw and the proper

statutory prescriptive period was tried by consent.
Issues B, C and D of Respondent's brief are entirely premised upon the 20-year statutory
period. However, despite having plead that in the 2011 Complaint, H.F.L.P. raised the 5-year
statutory time limit in its Pre-Trial Memorandum of November 19,2012, shortly after publication
ofthe Capstar III case. (See pending Motion to Augment the Record, and Record at p. 3.) Moreover,
as noted above, this issue was raised in opening arguments and never objected to by the Respondent.
I.R.C.P. Rule 15(b) provides:
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Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties. they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment ofthe pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence
is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action on defense upon the merits. The
court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
[Emphasis added]
H.F.L.P. acknowledges that its Complaint erroneously presumed 20-year period applied.
However, when the law became clear in 2012, H.F.'::".P. briefed the issue to both the Court and
opposing counsel. At no tim.) after filing that brief did the Respondent ever object or maintain that
H.F .L.P. 's position was not the law. In fact, it could not have, because the Supreme Court had finally
made it clear what the effect of the 2006 amendment was. Twin Falls City did not object at trial to
the introduction of evidence pre-2006. In fact, Mr. Urie's entire testimony about the property starts
in 1946 clear up until he and his family sold it to H.F .L.P. 's predecessors in 1992. Failure to amend
the pleadings to include issues tried by the express or implied consent of the parties does not effect
the result of the trial of those issues, and whether an issue has been tried with the consent of the
parties is a decision within the trial court's discretion. Watson v. Idaho Falls Canso!. Hasps., 111
Idaho 44, 720 P.2d 632 (1986). Where evidence concerning a prescriptive easement came into the
record without objection, it would invoke the provisions of the rule concerning issues tried by the
express or implied consent of the parties and the issue was therefore before the court. Steckleim v.

Montgomery, 98 Idaho 671, 570 P.2d 1359 (1977); Seeaiso, Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134,
689 P.2d 79 (Ct.App. 1984) (Plaintiff s failure to cite the particular statute oflimitations upon which
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it relied as a defense to the counterclaim would normally result in waiver of that defense; however,
where the evidence showed the statute of limitations issue was not only tried by consent, but it was
actually conceded by the defendant to be valid, it should be deemed to be raised in the pleadings.)

In the present case, all parties and the Court were made aware of the statutory period issue
post-Capstar III. Both the Court and the Respondent, Twin Falls City, tried the case premised
thereupon. At no time during the trial did Twin Falls City either argue to the Court that the 20-year
post-2006 amendment was the proper period or object to all ofthe evidence being pre-2006. It seems
disingenuous to now raise the issue for the first time on appeal and simultaneously argue H.F .L.P.
never raised the issue below.

In fact, the District Court recognized the statutory time period was five years in its

I

conclusions of law. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 46. The Court, however,
erroneously seemed to confuse the issue when it stated:
H.F.L.P. claims that the triggering date happened sometime before 2006 (when the
Legislature modified the statutory period from five years to twenty years). However,
the court cannot accept that conclusion because there is no evidence of the road being
used by the Vries from 1986 to 1992. Based on the lack of direct proof of when the
statutory period started and when it was satisfied, this element [statutory period of
time] has not been satisfied. ( R. 46)
The fact of the matter is that the evidence was put in the record at trial of when the prescriptive
easement arose, i.e. clear back in 1950 through 1970, and that evidence came in without objection. l
Because H.F.L.P. also presented evidence that the easement was continued to be used, and even
recognized by Twin Falls City and others, does not defeat the validity of the easement. Idaho has not

iIronically, even if the 20-year period applied-and it does not as a matter of law-the facts
still sustain a prescriptive easement over the non-BLM property subsequently acquired by Twin
Falls City, because the Vries adversely used the easement from the 1940s through 1986.
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yet imposed a prescriptive "look back period" over which adverse easements cannot be legitimized.
The trial court below had great anguish over that fact, and stubbornly refused to acknowledge, that
a prescriptive easement can be legitimized, even forty years after the fact. 2 These are erroneous
conclusions of law and are freely reviewable by this Court.
As a matter of law, however, H.F.L.P. need have only shown five years of continuous,
uninterrupted and adverse use in order to sustain its prescriptive easement, so long as that five years
predated the 2006 amendment. The District Court's concern about the lack of evidence of continuous
use from 1986 to 1992 is a complete red herring. Once established, the prescriptive easement
becomes the property right uf the adverse claimant without necessity of formal court action. This
Court should make that perfectly clear to the lower courts, because the confusion exists, about
whether an easement is valid inchoate or only after court adjudication. The nature ofIdaho law and
the history of prescriptive easements is that they are valid and binding property rights, even though
they have not formally been litigated. The judicial policy behind this is clear. There is no sense in
creating a quasi "snake river water adjudication" with respect to all the hundreds of thousands of
long standing, clearly recognized, and well-honored prescriptive easements that exist in our fine
State. The courts have enough easement claims arising by virtue of newly acquired, but disgruntled
neighbors who will not recognize long standing practices, customs and easement rights of their
predecessors. Enacting a rule that requires all easements be adjudicated even in the absence of
dispute would unnecessarily flood the court with litigants.

2It is also unclear whether the easement could be established years ago and persist until
now, even though no recorded easement was granted and the land is now owned by a public
entity. R. 47, fn. 13.
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2. The Court erroneously admitted the exhibits prepared by Lee Glaesmann.
Twin Falls City relies on LR.E. 803(8) to sustain the District Court's admission, over the
objection ofH.F.L.P., of the Glaesmann overlays and exhibits. However, that rule provides:
Public records and reports. Unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness, records, reports, statements, or data
compilations in any form of a public office or agency setting forth its regularly
conducted and regularly recorded activities, of matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. The
following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule: (A) investigative reports
by police and other law enforcement personnel, except when offered by an accused
in a criminal case; (B) investigative reports prepared by or for a government, public
office or an agency when offered by it in a case in which it is a party; ( C) factual
findings offered by the government in criminal cases; (D) factual findings resulting
from special investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident, except when
offered by an accused in a criminal case. [Emphasis added]
However, the documents in this case were admittedly prepared by Mr. Glaesmann, a Twin
Falls City employee, for use in this litigation. As was stated in Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123 (7th
Cir. 2013):
It is well established, though, that documents prepared in anticipation oflitigation are
not admissible underFRE 803(6). See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-14,63
S.Ct. 477,87 L.Ed. 645 (1943); see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305, 321, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed. 2d 314 (2009); Lust, 383 F.3d at 588;
Blackburn, 992 F.2d at 670; Bracey v. Herringa, 466 F.2d 702, 704-05 (7th Cir.
1972); United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 1957); Echo Acceptance
Corp. v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 267 F.3d 1068, 1091 (10 th Cir. 2001);
Scheerer v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 92 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8 th Cir. 1996). Litigation
generally is not a regularly conducted business activity. AMPATIMidwest, Inc. v. Ill.
Tool Works Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1045 (7th Cir. 1990); see Palmer, 318 U.S. at 114,
63 S.Ct. 477 (accident report created by railroad employee after an accident was not
a business record because its "primary utility [was] in litigating, not in railroading");
Timberlake Constr. Co. v. Us. Fid. & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 342 (loth Cir. 1995)
("It is well-established that one who prepares a document in anticipation oflitigation
is not acting in the regular course of business."). And documents prepared with an
eye toward litigation raise serious trustworthiness concerns because there is a strong
incentive to deceive (namely, avoiding liability). See Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d
Appellant's Reply Brief - Page 6

976,991 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.) (Documents prepared for litigation are "dripping
with motivations to misrepresent"), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109,63 S.Ct. 477,87 L.Ed. 645;
Lust, 383 F.3d at 588; AMPATIMidwest, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1045; Bracey, 466 F.2d at
704-05; see also Fed.R.Evld. 803(6) advisory committee's note ("Absence of
routineness raises lack of motivation to be accurate."); cf Leon v. Penn Cent. Co.,
428 F.2d 528, 530 (7th Cir. 1970) (accident report prepared in anticipation of
litigation at defendant's behest was admissible where it was offered by plaintiff);
Sana v. Hawaiian Cruises, Ltd., 181 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (same).
The same principles that would preclude admission of evidence prepared in anticipation of
litigation under the business records exception is equally applicable, if not more so, under the public
records exception to the hearsay rule. First off, to qualify as a valid public record, the exhibit must
be records, reports, statements, or data compilations ... setting forth its regularly conducted and
regularly recorded activities. Documents prepared in anticipation of litigation are neither regularly
conducted nor regularly recorded, unless, of course, the public agency is engaged in full time
litigation (such as an attorney general's office or prosecutor's office). See e.g. Jordan v. Binns at
1132 (admission of the crash report was not admissible under Rule 803(8), the public records
exception to the hearsay rule).
Secondly, public records containing "matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law
and as to which there was a duty to report" are admissible under the public records exception. Again,
the documents in this case clearly fall outside of that category. Finally, "factual findings resulting
from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law" are also deemed admissible public
records (subject to certain specified exceptions set forth in Rule 803(8»). Mr. Glaesmann's charts
and overlays failed to fall within the public records exception and are "dripping with motivations to
misrepresent" .
The lower Court erred in admitting these exhibits over the objection ofH.F.L.P.
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3. The lower Court erroneously presumed that easement by necessity must be proved by clear
and convincine evidence.
The issue of the easement by necessity by and between the H.F .L.P. parcels was another issue
tried by consent, if not clearly elucidated in the pleadings. However, the Court presumed that the
burden of proof is the same as that for a prescriptive easement, wherein the Court stated, "The court
believes the burden [for easement by necessity] would be the same as easement by prescription-that
is, proving the easement by clear and convincing evidence. While the case law is scant on the
subject, the two cases involving implied easements which speak to the burden of proof simply recite
that the "burden of proof rests upon the person asserting it to show the existence of facts necessary
to create by implication an easement appurtenant to his estate." Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins,
112 Idaho 693,827 P.2d 706,711 (Ct.App. 1992); Seeaiso, Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204,360 P.2d
403,407 (1961).
Respondent's assertion that the burden was on H.F.L.P. to prove its implied easement case
by clear and convincing evidence is misplaced. Easements by prescription are adverse and diminish
the property rights ofthe subservient estate. Case law requires proving a prescriptive easement case
by clear and convincing evidence. Easements by necessity or implied easements arise by a policy of
implied consent, i.e. that at the time of severance of the unified parcel, the grantor must have
intended a right of ingress and egress to the property, and accordingly, the easement is presumed to
be within the contemplation of the parties. In this case, when Uries sold their property west of Rock
Creek, segregated into different parcels, presumably they did not intend to land lock any of the
buyers. While easements by necessity are not necessarily favored, the policy of making the burden
of proof greater than in ordinary cases is not justified. H.F .L.P. sufficiently proved it was entitled to
Appellant's Reply Brief - Page 8

an easement by and between Parcels 3 and 2 of its property, across property recently acquired by the
City as an easement by necessity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Court should reverse and remand the matter to the trial court
directing an easement by necessity by and between Parcels 3 and 2, and an easement by prescription
across all of Twin Falls City property leading to the H.F.L.P. property, save and except only across
the former BLM parcel. As regards that parcel, the Court should set aside the judgment of the State
Court as being beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court to adjudicate. Alternatively, the matter
should be remanded for new trial for the admission of improper evidence into the record.
DATED THIS:::2k day of March, 2014.
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